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Women managers who have broken the glass ceiling... have
proven that effective leaders don't come from one mold. They have
demonstrated that using a command-and-control style of managing
others, a style generally associated with men in large, traditional organi-
zations, is not the only way to succeed. I
Whereas men's legal reasoning may be influenced by the masculine
concern about separation and autonomy, women's primary concern with
intimacy, connection and community may influence their legal reason-
ing in different ways.2
The [legal] profession must become more open to a wide variety of
lawyering styles for both men and women in order to provide all lawyers
professional opportunities, unconstrained by gender stereotypes.
3
Introduction
This Article explores issues concerning the identification of male
and female styles of lawyering.4 The three quotes set out above display
somewhat different approaches to whether men and women are different.
* Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Assistant Director, GULC
Sex Discrimination Clinic. A.B. 1979, Princeton University; J.D. 1983, Columbia University;
LL.M. 1989, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Deborah Rhode, Ann
Shalleck, and Joan Williams for their advice and comments; and Nancy Tong for her research
assistance.
1. Judy Rosener, Ways Women Lead, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 119. As
Deborah Rhode points out, the study on which these conclusions are based has methodological
flaws, such as no control group. Letter from Deborah Rhode to Naomi Cahn (1992) (on file
with the Hastings Law Journal).
2. Maryse H. Richards, The Feminine Perspective in Law, CBA RECORD, May 1988 at
17, 20.
3. ABA COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELE-
GATES 13 (1988) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
4. By styles, I mean methods of practice, such as ways of relating to participants in the
legal system-including clients, judges, and other lawyers-as well as ways of arguing. Styles
are, of course, affected by, and affect, content. For analyses of how different methods of ap-
proaching clients affect the substance of representation, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Ger-
ald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Col-
laboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989).
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I have juxtaposed them to show the widespread concern with male and
female styles. As they show, in order to consider and evaluate theories
about gender-based lawyering, we must grapple with the dilemmas of
difference: the debates over whether women are different from men and
over how, despite women's differences from each other, we can talk
about "women." 5
Given the complexities in feminist theory about sameness/difference
(and related theories) and in a feminist practice, I have found no easy
answer to the question of whether male and female lawyers have the
same or different styles of litigation. Ultimately, however, the question
whether gender-based styles of lawyering exist is not as important as ex-
amining the different methods by which we practice law and the implica-
tions of seemingly different ethics of lawyering for ourselves as lawyers,
for our clients, and for transforming legal practice.6
To explore how this debate can inform (and distort) the lawyering
process, I first suggest the elements of a female lawyering style based on
an ethic of care; second, I critique this model and its underlying assump-
tions. Trying to correlate a female style of lawyering with a particular
set of attributes ascribed to women, such as those of an ethic of care, is
not only inaccurate, it is dangerous. Rather than identify as "female"
one particular style of lawyering, I argue that many different styles of
lawyering exist. I argue that feminist legal theory helps us uncover these
5. See Martha Minow, Introduction: Finding Our Paradoxes, Affirming Our Beyond, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1989) (identifying the first stage of feminist scholarship as
claiming the same rights and privileges granted to men, the second stage as accommodating for
women's historical differences from men, and the third stage as using men as the starting point
and ignoring differences among women); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory
in Law: The Difference It Makes, 1 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript
at 19-21, on file with the Hastings Law Journal) (affirming the importance of using women as a
category for analysis); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REv. 581, 585-605 (1990) (questioning how feminist theory recognizes differences
such as race); Susan H. Williams, Feminism's Search for the Feminine: Essentialism, Utopian-
ism, and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 700, 707 (1990) (labeling feminism "as trapped
between the horns of a dilemma, unable to unify its goals of validating women and their experi-
ence on the one hand while maintaining the critical distance necessary to tolerance of diversity
and change on the other").
6. As Ann Shalleck points out, a focus on styles may be misleading if it assumes that
"style" can be separated from substance. See Ann Shalleck, The Feminist Transformation of
Lawyering: A Response to Naomi Cahn, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1071 (1992). Nonetheless, the fo-
cus on styles allows us a more complete understanding of legal methods. See Kathryn
Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Method, 16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 373 (1991) (book
review) (beginning exploration of impact of feminism on legal methods); Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990) (tentatively identifying the legal
methods used by feminists); Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences.
The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25 (1990) [hereinafter Fineman,
The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship] (similar observations).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
styles and figure out when they are useful in our own litigation. Addi-
tionally, feminist theory teaches us how to use these different lawyering
styles to challenge existing practices, and can change the way we prac-
tice, how we think about ourselves as lawyers, and how we think about
our clients.
By putting into context observed gender differences in litigation
styles, we are better able to question, and understand, the significance of
these differences. 7 Ultimately, I argue that what others have conceptual-
ized as a female style of lawyering is an incomplete picture of some of the
more positive attributes traditionally ascribed to women in our culture;
8
at the same time, this "female style" is descriptive of many ways of prac-
ticing law that are not necessarily female. Some of the attributes of this
style of lawyering are traditional methods for law practice, while others
are innovations that may profoundly change how we practice law and
how we act as lawyers.
Because of a focus on gender, we are able to uncover and develop
alternative styles that have been obscured by the dominant and existing
legal system. With a gender focus, we accept that society has con-
structed concepts of women who are supposed to embody specific attrib-
utes-although we do not accept that these are either universally valid,
or even accurate, constructions of some women. Looking at the con-
structed images is useful, however, so that we can claim some of the
attributes in order to reconstruct lawyering, and so that we can use out-
sider attributes to challenge dominant images. With an outsider perspec-
tive, we can revalue lawyering characteristics in an effort to create new
legal methods.
7. See Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cul-
tural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1788 (1991) [hereinafter Rhode, The "No-Problem" Prob-
lem] ("The limited data available [on legal practice] reveal some significant sex-linked
differences, but their extent depends heavily on context."). See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ex-
ploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and
Social Change, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 289, 304-12 (1989) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Exploring a Research Agenda], in which the author asserts that research on women in law has
emphasized "occupational separation within the [legal] profession and the tensions between
family life and work life." She argues that this focus may be inappropriate due to the assump-
tion that women bear the primary responsibility for caring for the family and in light of many
women's complaints that traditional work demands should be changed to accommodate these
responsibilities. Id She also notes her "curiosity about how having two genders (and count-
less ethnic and racial variations) in an institution formerly all male might alter the structures
and practices." Id. at 314. Although I am interested in similar questions, this Article focuses
on how alternative values, which, while associated with gender, are not necessarily gender
descriptive, may change aspects of how we practice law.
8. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. Rnv. 797 (1989) [hereinafter
Williams, Deconstructing Gender].
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My hope is that shifting the framework away from a focus on cate-
gories of style to a more contextual perspective will help us to transcend
the difficulties of difference and move towards a feminist lawyering pro-
cess, rather than a feminine lawyering process. 9 Thus, this Article joins
in the process of evaluation current models of lawyering and creating
new visions.10 Parts I and II of the Article tentatively define, and then
critique, a female lawyering process. Then, in Part III I choose one value
associated with a feminist process, that of connection, and show how it
might be useful in a contextual lawyering process.I1 I discuss its promise
of change, as well as its problems.
I. Thinking About a Female Style of Lawyering
A. Women in the Law
This section explores some of the reasons underlying contemporary
discussion of male and female styles of lawyering and discusses various
efforts to study whether these differences exist. These studies attempt to
understand men and women's experiences in law school and their lives as
lawyers. In addition, they look at how existing institutions have adapted
to the influx of women in the legal profession.
What has caused a contemporary rethinking of the existence of male
or female styles of lawyering? 12 The answer is complex and includes ste-
reotypes about men and women, studies of differences between male and
female lawyers, theories about the construction by males of the current
legal system, perceptions about male and female lawyers, and the cele-
bration of women's differences from men in some feminist writing.
Sometimes, perhaps, the cause is a longing for an alternative style to the
hard-ball, aggressive tactics of many lawyers. Or, it simply may be that
because women have been excluded for so long, we imagine, and hope,
they will act differently. The idea has pervasive, even seductive, appeal.
Indeed, studies do show differences in how some men and women react
to law school, how they respond to the legal system and decide moral
issues, and how their styles are perceived by others, lending even more
credibility to the supposed existence of different styles.
9. See Naomi R. Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1991).
10. See Ann Shalleck's call for such new visions in Shalleck, supra note 6.
11. See Joan Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS 644, 646
(1987) (contending that, rather than analyzing gender differences, feminists should examine
the adequacy and morality of care).
12. This is not, of course, a new concern. See Virginia G. Drachman, Women Lawyers
and the Quest for Professional Identity in Late Nineteenth Century America, 88 MICH. L. Rnv.
2414, 2428-29 (1990) (discussing debates among late nineteenth century women at the Equity
Club about whether women brought "uniquely feminine qualities to the law").
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Within the past five years there have been several major studies on
whether male and female students experience law school differently-at
Stanford University Law School13 and University of California, Boalt
Hall14 -as well as numerous anecdotal discussions.15 The studies found
differences in students' reasons for attending law school and in class par-
ticipation rates. Women were far more likely to choose to attend law
school because they wanted to serve society.16 Women were significantly
less likely to participate in class. 17 The Boalt study found that white and
minority women and minority men participated at lower rates than did
white men.18 However, the Boalt and Stanford studies differed on other
measures of women's alienation from the legal profession, such as their
law school performance, 19 and their feelings toward law school.20
13. Janet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical
Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1209 (1988).
14. Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an
Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990).
15. E.g., Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988) (discussing Yale law students). It is not, of course, only the law in
which the existence of male and female styles is an issue. For example, Deborah Tannen's
popular book, You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation, suggests that
men and women have different ways of speaking. DEBORAH TANNEN, You JusT DON'T UN-
DERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION 13-19 (1990).
16. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 28; Taber et al., supra note 13, at 1238.
17. See also Weiss & Melling, supra note 15, at 1333 n.101 (noting that in 19 Yale Law
School courses for which data were collected, men participated 1.63 times as much as women
in the classrooms).
18. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 29. The study reported, "[A] majority of wo-
men and people of color indicated that they never asked questions or volunteered answers in
class, in contrast to approximately two-thirds of the white males, who stated that they had
done both with some frequency." Id
19. While the surveys did not ask identical questions on this issue, the questions are
sufficiently comparable to show dramatic differences. The Stanford study asked students to
describe their feelings about their performance in law school, and found "no significant differ-
ences between currently enrolled female and male students." Taber et al., supra note 13, at
1238. The Boalt study asked students about their satisfaction with their grades, as well as to
describe their feelings about themselves, their classmates, and their experiences at the law
school. The study found that a majority of men were satisfied, while a majority of women Were
not. There were also racial differentials, with white students of both sexes feeling more satis-
fied than both men and women of color. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 30, 51. Thirty-
three percent of women and only 17% of men seriously had considered dropping out of law
school (41% of women of color, 22% of men of color, 31% of white women, and 17% of white
men). Id. at 53.
20. The Stanford study found no significant differences between how male and female
students felt toward the law school. Taber et al., supra note 13, at 1239. By contrast, 42% of
men as opposed to 28% of women liked Boalt (26% of women of color, 35% of men of color,
29% of white women, and 43% of white men). Homer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 53 tbl.
8c. When the responses of students include liking Boalt more than disliking it, the differences
in favorable perceptions toward the law school decrease. The study indicated that 77% of men
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Notwithstanding the statistical differences between studies, it is clear that
men and women have some differing reactions to law school.21
Studies of women's responses to the legal system also show some
gender-based distinctions. Unlike the Boalt study, the Stanford survey
also sent questionnaires to its graduates. The study found significant dif-
ferences between men and women graduates' satisfaction with their law
school performance and their feelings towards law school.22 It also
found that women responded somewhat differently than men to two hy-
potheticals-one on media law and one on legal standing-designed to
test whether moral reasoning was dissimilar. The media law hypotheti-
cal asked respondents to balance the right to a free press against an indi-
vidual's right to privacy where a reporter snapped a picture of a naked
woman being dragged from her house by police.23 In the standing hypo-
thetical respondents were asked whether a mother could appeal her son's
murder conviction and imminent execution. 24 The study found some
limited support for the conclusion that male and female lawyers would
find different factors relevant in reaching their decisions.
In another study of lawyers' attitudes, Stacy Caplow and Shira
Scheindlin surveyed 1975 and 1976 female graduates from fourteen law
schools (there was no male comparison group).25 Approximately one
half of the respondents believed that their sex had hampered their suc-
cess. 26 Caplow and Scheindlin concluded that, underlying many of the
problems for the women attorneys they surveyed, "perhaps too amor-
phous to touch, is the very nature of the practice of law.... Many of our
respondents said they would prefer that the law was constructive, proac-
tive, and that the bottom line was less important than the person the
lawyer seeks to help."'27 The authors believe that if these seemingly fe-
male qualities affect how law is practiced, the relationship between law-
and 69% of women felt favorably toward Boalt (66% women of color, 66% men of color, 71%
white women, and 79% white men). Id
21. The causes of these differences are unknown.
22. Male graduates reported feeling more satisfied with their law school performance
than did female graduates. Taber et al., supra note 13, at 1241. Male graduates tended to have
more positive feelings toward law school than did female graduates. Id. at 1242. Note, how-
ever, that responses by current male and female students showed no significant differences in
either satisfaction with performance or positive feelings toward the law school. Id. at 1241-42.
23. Id. at 1277.
24. Id. at 1278; see infra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
25. Stacy Caplow & Shira A. Scheindlin, "Portrait of a Lady" The Woman Lawyer in
the 1980s, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 391 (1990).
26. Id. at 419.
27. Id. at 428.
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yers and their clients, and the lawyers' decisionmaking process, then
women will have a "profound" effect on the law.
28
In one extensive study of the different moralities, the authors found
that female lawyers were more likely to be care-oriented than male law-
yers. 29 Other studies of graduates have focused on lifestyle differences,
finding, for example, that seventy percent of men, but only forty-four
percent of women worked in private practice five years after graduation,
and that women are more likely to avoid working long hours when they
have children than are men.30 These studies show other measurable dif-
ferences between men and women. Women seem more likely to prefer
less adversarial methods of resolving disputes that do not harm the other
side-relying on methods of problem solving and reconciliation rather
than aggressive posturing3 I-and women are more likely to be the pri-
mary, and expected, caretakers of children.
Studies also have supported the belief that women suffer discrimina-
tion in their legal employment and in the courts.32 Various studies of
gender bias in the courts have found that judges treat women differently,
and that male lawyers are even worse than judges in their discriminatory
treatment.33 Women also are the subject of differing perceptions by
28. Id.
29. RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECI-
SIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989).
30. David L. Chambers, Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women and Men Lawyers
and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 251, 261 (1989) (surveying
four classes of University of Michigan Law School graduates).
31. Caplow & Scheindlin, supra note 25, at 423.
32. See Emily Couric, Women in the Large Firms: High Price ofAdmission?, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 11, 1989, at S2 (survey finding that at least 60% of its respondents had been subject to
unwanted sexual attention and that many believed opportunities to get ahead in law firms were
better for men than for women). Several women have sued their law firms, claiming sex dis-
crimination under federal equal employment law. Eg., Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S.
69 (1984); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1991). In
October, 1991, Baker & McKenzie's first woman partner sued her firm charging sex discrimi-
nation. Ingrid BeaU said of her lawsuit, "I can afford to do this. I don't have 30 years practic-
ing law ahead of me. The young ones can't [sue], because then they're a troublemaker...
[Aind there is very little sympathy for young ladies who cause trouble." Michael Abramowitz,
One Woman v. Her Law Firm; In a Discrimination Suit, the Chicago Attorney Becomes the
Plaintiff, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1991, at D1.
33. Indeed, from the outset, a bias against women exists in that they are often presumed
to be legal assistants or secretaries, rather than lawyers. UTAH TASK FORCE REPORT ON
GENDER AND JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL 96-99 (1990) [hereinafter
UTAH REPORT]; see also THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMM'N,
REPORT 200-01, 204 (1990) (noting that male lawyers exclude or ignore female lawyers in
court and in "warm-up" conversations before court; male judges question the credentials of
female lawyers but not male lawyers; and court support staff, both male and female, engage in
biased conduct). In court women are often subjected to hostile remarks, sexist jokes, com-
ments about physical appearance or attributes, and verbal or physical sexual advances. UTAH
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courts, other lawyers, and clients. The profession has been, and is still,
primarily composed of white male lawyers.34 There are real differences
in how seriously women are taken as attorneys.35 Even if women do not
act differently from men, they look different. One comparatively recent
article pointed out (in all earnestness) that women face "[t]he initial 'mi-
nus' of being recognizably non-male," but counseled that this could be
"immediately superseded" if the women were knowledgeable and well-
prepared.
36
Judges, attorneys, and court personnel do not give as much credibil-
ity to women as to men,3 7 and perceive women as acting differently from
men. The ABA Commission noted:
Not all male lawyers resort to the stereotypical aggressive, hard-ball,
'male' style of lawyering. Many are soft-spoken and conciliatory in
negotiations. They may be more skilled at listening than at arguing.
But when men display these varieties in lawyering styles, it is regarded
as just that-a difference in style. When women depart from the stere-
otypical style of aggressive lawyering, it is more likely to be regarded
as a gender difference and a basis for questioning competence.
38
Women and men, then, both use different styles at different times. Wo-
men, however, are perceived as using a female style when they depart
from traditional patterns of lawyering; men are not. Men's differences
are accepted, while women's differences are ascribed to gender and, cor-
respondingly devalued.
REPORT, supra, at 99-100; MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMM., GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS 120-25 (1989). For a summary of the types of gender bias problems that women
confront, see Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1990); see also Ann J. Gellis, Great Expectations: Vomen in the Legal
Profession, A Commentary on State Studies, 66 IND. L.J. 941 (1991) (summarizing Indiana
gender bias report and noting its consistency with reports from other states).
34. In 1989 lawyers numbered 741,000; women comprised only 22%. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1991, at 395 tbl. 652 (11 lth ed.
1991).
35. See Karen Gross, Foreword: She's My Lawyer and She's a Woman, 35 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 293 (1990) (relating her experience of being introduced as an anomaly: a lawyer who
was a woman).
36. Nell B. Strachan, A Map for Women on the Road to Success, 70 A.B.A. J., May 1984,
at 94, 96. The author also notes, "While most male lawyers are assumed to be serious and to
be embarking on a lifelong career, females still are viewed as question marks who may quit and
stay home to raise children." Id. at 94.
37. E.g., Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 15, 129-46 (1986-87).
38. ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 4; see also Lynn H. Schafran, Practicing Law in a
Sexist Society, in WOMEN, THE COURTS, AND EQUALITY 191, 202 (Laura L. Crites & Wini-
fred L. Hepperle eds., 1987) (identifying the double bind for women attorneys: if they are soft-
spoken, they are perceived as feminine; if they are assertive, they are "put down as a bitch").
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There is evidence that men and women experience substantial differ-
ences in treatment within the legal profession. Given these differences, in
conjunction with stereotypes about the appropriate roles of men and wo-
men and theories about difference, it is understandable why the question
of whether men and women use different styles is relevant. The existing
system reflects male experiences and viewpoints. 39 I thus focus on exam-
ining the existence of a female style. An image of a female style suggests
that it is different from what currently exists, and, implicitly, that what
currently exists is male.4°
B. A Female Lawyering Process
This section suggests what a female style of lawyering might look
like. By drawing on the work of feminists who have suggested that men
and women speak in a different voice, it is possible to outline some of the
dimensions of this alternative style.
Let us start by imagining a female style of lawyering based on these
studied differences, together with observations from the work of rela-
tional and affiliational feminists such as Carol Gilligan and Nel Nod-
dings.41 Simply summarized, these feminists assert that women use an
ethic of care in their moral reasoning, while men are more oriented to an
ethic of rights.42 Women are more caring and more oriented towards
relationships than are men. Women tend to perceive morally troubling
problems as situations in which people might be hurt,43 and then try to
resolve conflicts by strategies that maintain connection and relation-
ship.44 Correspondingly, women are contextual, looking at surrounding
39. Nel Noddings, Ethics from the Standpoint of Women, in THEORETICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES ON GENDER DIFFERENCES 160, 161-66 (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990), discusses some of
the dificulties of identifying philosophy as male-we cannot say that simply because almost all
philosophers have been male that philosophy itself is male-but notes that it is useful to see
how a male perspective affects philosophy. I nonetheless believe that, to undertake this in-
quiry, one must model a male perspective, or the process becomes circular. See Wendy W.
Williams, Notesfrom A First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99 [hereinafter Williams, A
First Generation].
40. E.g., Fineman, The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, supra note 6, at 31 n.19;
Williams, A First Generation, supra note 39, at 112 (arguing that what unites feminists is a
belief that the current system is male and transmits male values).
41. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN (Carol Gilligan et al. eds.,
1990); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION
(1984).
42. See, e.g., Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Development, in WOMEN AND
MORAL THEORY, 19, 23 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987).
43. JACK & JACK, supra note 29, at 173.
44. NODDINGS, supra note 41, at 8.
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circumstances. 45 Men, by contrast, are oriented towards individual au-
tonomy and impartial rules. They tend to see problems in terms of viola-
tions of rights,46 rather than relationships between people. Men are more
likely to resolve conflicts by examining competing rights, and applying
neutral and abstract standards.47
The implicit critique of the legal system is that it has been con-
structed by (white) men to accord with male values, overlooking or de-
valuing female values. The legal system values claims of individual
rights, and overlooks claims that are based on connection. A legal sys-
tem based on connection, rather than on competing rights, would result
in valuing different aspects of each case. For example, in pregnant sub-
stance abuser cases the issues are currently framed as a conflict between
the rights of the fetus and those of the mother, rather than a valuing of
the connection between mother and fetus.48 When such a problem is
viewed as a conflict between competing rights, it leads to state prosecu-
tion of mothers for substance abuse; when viewed in terms of connection,
it suggests that a more appropriate outcome would be better information
about birth control and improved prenatal care for pregnant substance
abusers. 49
Using ethic of care principles, what would lawyering look like?
Others have begun to answer this question by imagining lawyering in the
following terms:
1. More negotiation, mediation, and other alternatives to tradi-
tional adversarial dispute resolution;50
45. GILLIGAN, supra note 41, at 38; NODDINGS, supra note 41, at 96; Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 587
(1986).
46. JACK & JACK, supra note 29, at 173.
47. Nona Plessner Lyons, Two Perspectives on Self, Relationships, and Morality, in MAP-
PING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 41, at 21, 36-42.
48. Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy,
103 HARV. L. REv. 1325, 1326 (1990).
49. Id. at 1342; see, eg., Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda, supra note 7, at
316.
50. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 50-55 (1986) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Portia in a Different Voice]; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Comparative Sociology of
Women Lawyers: The "Feminization" of the Legal Profession, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 897,
915 (1986) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, The Comparative Sociology] ("Women and trial ad-
vocates have argued for a different style of trial advocacy--conversations with fact-finders-
rather than persuasive intimidation.")
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2. more appreciation of the other party's perspective '-more un-
derstanding and recognition of that party's interests;
52
3. more appreciation for the relational context in which the client's
problem arises, more understanding of the totality of our client's experi-
ence and more listening to her;
4. less aggressive, confrontational trial and pretrial tactics-more
disagreement on real issues than creation of disputes solely to disagree;
and
5. more altruistic reasons for choosing to become lawyers-more
public interest work.
In terms of structuring the relationship between work and nonwork,
this change of perspective would lead to the following: Less time at
work; work environments structured to allow for parenting (child care in
the workplace); and more alternative forms of structuring work-wider
acceptance of part-time work and a reluctance to travel, and less hierar-
chy within the workplace.
53
As is clear from these lists, a female style of lawyering goes well
beyond issues of work and family.54 When I describe this structure to
my friends who are white women or women of color and who are law-
yers, many of them agree that this accurately characterizes their lawyer-
ing styles and goals. As a small test of these perceptions, I asked sixty
people who attended a 1991 Association of American Law Schools panel
on Lawyering in a Different Voice to answer a questionnaire about male
and female lawyers. While the responses of male and female lawyers did
not differ dramatically, the respondents did conclude that differences ex-
ist between male and female lawyers. More than seventy-five percent of
all respondents agreed that female lawyers are better able to listen to
clients, and an even higher percentage agreed that women were more
likely to need child care at the workplace and to take time off to spend
with children.55
51. Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda, supra note 7, at 316.
52. See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion and
Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011, 1030 (1989); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85
MICH. L. Rrv. 1574, 1650-53 (1987). Both articles give suggestions about the need for "good
faith" dialogue and argumentation in litigation.
53. See Judith S. Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward Gen-
der Equality, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 111, 123 (1988) (noting that "the 'mommy track'-often a
three- or four-day work week-has become a standard alternative rather than an ad hoc privi-
lege"; and providing other examples of ways of restructuring the workplace, including per deal
arrangements, no nights or weekends, and no travel arrangements).
54. Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda, supra note 7, at 314.
55. The survey has merely anecdotal significance. I do not pretend that it has any statis-
tical validity. Not only is the sample size far too small, but the group of participants at this
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As this discussion shows, there are alternative approaches to the
practice of law that accord with traditional feminine values. If women
could redesign the legal profession, there might be significant differ-
ences.56 These differences point to a method of practice that is more
respectful of clients and of the other parties, as well as more accommo-
dating of individual lifestyle preferences and family circumstances.
II. Critiques of a "Female Style of Lawyering"
Notwithstanding its articulation of improvements to the existing
system, the preceding discussion does not describe accurately a female
style of lawyering. Instead, it models a style of lawyering based on an
ethic of care, and then ascribes this model to women. While I appreciate
the insights from the ethic of care, it seems dangerously inaccurate to
correlate a women's style with this ethic of care. The following sections
explain why. I discuss three major problems with this analysis: first,
there is a theoretical problem in using unmodified terms such as male or
female to describe any lawyering style; second, psychological and socio-
logical research does not support such broad definitions of styles; and
third, an ethic of care is, at best, an incomplete description of a female
style that limits alternative perceptions of lawyering.
A. The Problem of Essentialism
As theoretical and analytic categories, the unmodified terms "male"
and "female" are problematic. By identifying characteristics as male or
female, we ignore differences based on race, class, sexual orientation, or
other significant social and cultural experiences which shape how we
view the world and act in it. In this essentialist position we simplify
without acknowledging the diversity within groups.57 For example, to
talk about male or female assumes that generalizations about white and
session was self-selected. Indeed, there was a competing session on critical race theory and,
although the questionnaire asked respondents to mark their race, no one marked anything
other than "white."
56. See Rhode, The "No-Problem"Problem, supra note 7, at 1788-89 (discussing studies
which do not show substantial differences between male and female lawyers and judges). She
suggests, however, "that a variety of cultural forces make all-female associations likely to ex-
press different concerns than male-dominated organizations." IaM at 1789 n.284.
57. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988); PATRICIA WIL-
LIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAw PROFESSOR (1991); Harris,
supra note 5; see also Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African American Women's History and
The Metalanguage of Race, 17 SIGNS 251, 256 (1992) (noting that "[e]ven black women's
history ... nonetheless reflects the totalizing impulse of race in such concepts as 'black wo-
manhood' . . . concepts that mask real differences of class, status and color, regional culture,
and a host of other configurations of difference").
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black women, and white and black men are accurate. But, we know this
is not true. The recent study of Boalt law students illustrates the fallacies
in these generalizations. The differences in response varied by both gen-
der and race. Questions often elicited very different responses from
members of different racial groups. For example, fifty-one percent of all
women questioned felt pressured to set aside their own values in order to
think like a lawyer; but white women and women of color differed by
thirteen percentage points: sixty-one percent of women of color said they
felt pressured, compared to forty-eight percent of white women.58 Addi-
tionally, thirty percent of women of color but only sixteen percent of
white women--constituting twenty percent of all women questioned-
felt negatively about their lives since entering law school.59 While the
differentials may not be dramatic, they do show the difficulties of genera-
lizing about a particular group.
Even if, notwithstanding difficulties inherent in essentialism, we rec-
ognize styles as male or female, we risk perpetuating the very subordina-
tion of "the female voice" that many of us, as feminists, are trying to
overcome. When something is characterized as female, it is generally
devalued 6° or deliberately and self-consciously overvalued. At one ex-
treme, this results in exclusion of women from the legal profession be-
cause they are so different from the correct, male style. At another
extreme, this results in celebration of a female style, presumably sup-
planting the currently dominant style, and thus privileging one style as
the correct way to practice law. Neither of these extremes is desirable.
While we should not be frightened to characterize something as female
lest it be devalued, we should be careful in deciding what is female and
what we wish to defend as so. Similarly, we should not construct a new,
although female, style to be emulated. Characterizing lawyering meth-
ods with the labels of male and female is limiting; it excludes alternative
styles, and pretends that there are no overlapping attributes. As shown
by the research briefly discussed below, people exhibit a mixture of
"male" and "female" traits.
58. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 52. Thirty-five percent of men of color felt
pressure, while 28% of white men so responded. Id.
59. Id. at 53. Men of color were at 16%; white men were at 13%. Id. There were
significantly different responses to the question of who was more likely to speak in a class
taught by a professor of color. Id. at 54. While 9% of all male students surveyed agreed that
they were more likely to speak in such a class, 24% of all female students felt this way. Id.
60. An example is "women's work." See Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLI-
TICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 453-65 (David Kairys ed., 1990). Deborah Tannen
points out that "if women's and men's styles are shown to be different, it is usually women who
are told to change." TANNEN, supra note 15, at 15.
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B. The Problem of Research
As a practical matter, the research does not support essentialist cate-
gories of male and female that correlate with moral orientations. Specifi-
cally, Carol Gilligan's research does not provide a basis for
universalization of the terms "male" and "female"-although it does al-
low us to understand and perceive more fully the dimensions of an alter-
native voice.61 Neither sex uses either of the moral orientations
exclusively. Many men and most women actually combine aspects of
each orientation in their thought processes. 62 Although when they focus
on one perspective, most men do choose a rights perspective, most wo-
men do not choose a care perspective. In studies only of men it is harder
to perceive a care focus, and, thus it is less likely to appear as a significant
factor; only by including women can we perceive the dimensions of an
ethic of care.63 As an example we may look to one of Carol Gilligan's
studies. She asked eighty educationally advantaged people to describe a
moral conflict. Fifty-four of the participants focused on either an ethic of
justice or care. Of these fifty-four, one third of the female respondents
focused on justice, and one third focused on care; all but one of the men
chose the justice perspective. 4 While this shows that men are more
likely to choose an ethic of rights, it does not show that women are more
likely to choose an ethic of care. While it demonstrates the necessity of
including women in order to appreciate the different themes, it also cau-
tions us not to generalize that the different voice we have identified is
feminine-that is, it describes many women, some men, and possibly the
views of some members of other socially subordinant groups. 65
Moreover, we must remember that what researchers find depends, at
least to some extent, on what they look for and how they look for it.66
61. Carol Gilligan herself has been somewhat inconsistent on how strongly she correlates
the ethic of care with gender. Compare GILLIGAN, supra note 41, at 2, with Tronto, supra note
11, at 645.
62. JACK & JACK, supra note 29, at 10-11; Nona Plessner Lyons, Two Perspectives: On
Self Relationships and Morality, 53 HARV. EDUC. REV. 125 (1983).
63. See Gilligan, supra note 42, at 25-26.
64. Id. at 25; Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanucci, Two Moral Orientations, in MAPPING THE
MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 41, at 73, 81; see also Diana T. Meyers, The Socialized Individual
and Individual Autonomy, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 42, at 139, 144 (not-
ing that, although men rarely deviate from an ethic of rights perspective, there is no similar
uniformity among women with respect to the ethic of care perspective).
65. See Tronto, supra note 11, at 650-51.
66. See e.g., Andrew D. Gitlin, Educative Research, Voice, and Social Change, 60 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 443 (1990); Suzanne J. Kessler, The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Man-
agement of Intersexed Infants, 16 SIGNS 3 (1990); Barrie Thorne, Children and Gender: Con-
structions of Difference, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER DIFFERENCES, supra
note 39, at 100, 112; see also Janet Shibley Hyde, Meta-Analysis and the Psychology of Gender
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Research on boys and girls has been characterized by a focus on analyz-
ing the duality of gender. Instead, and more productively, it could focus
on cross-gender groupings, examining boys and girls playing together,
and analyzing differences among boys and among girls that show the
variations within gender.67
Like the researchers, we, as observers, are influenced by our own
gendered expectations. 68 Babies who are born of indeterminate sex can
be socialized to become either boys or girls.69 External stimuli have an
enormous impact on young children. One of my favorite stories about
gender socialization concerns the three year-old daughter of friends. My
friends refused to put a dress on Randy until she asked for it; conse-
quently, Randy always wore pants or overalls. People who did not know
what sex she was frequently commented, "What an active boy you
have." When my friends responded by saying they thought their daugh-
ter was pretty special, the commenters began to coo, and exclaimed, "She
is so adorable." This child was experiencing, in a visible manner, how
children learn gender-appropriate behavior; the commenters were dis-
playing their expectations of how little girls and boys act. Clearly, there
are powerful, and presently uncontrollable, influences that reinforce ste-
reotypes of men and women.
C. The Problem of Incompleteness
Finally, the list of characteristics ascribed to women by relational
feminists is incomplete. Only the strongest of those attributes tradition-
ally ascribed to women emerge in the depiction of an ethic of care.70
These positive aspects of womanhood include caring and nurturing, as
well as a focus on relationships. The definition of an ethic of care does
not include other conventional attributes of femininity, such as passivity
and dependence, in its canon.71 A female style of lawyering would not be
a completely positive model, and should account for negative attributes
Differences, 16 SIGNS 55, 69 (1990) (discussing studies of the relationship between the sex of
the researchers and their findings on gender differences which indicated that male researchers
found larger gender differences than did female researchers).
67. Thorne, supra note 66, at 103-05.
68. Ethnographers have long confronted this issue of simultaneous participation and ob-
servation in the same culture. See, eg., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CUL-
TURES (1973); HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW (June Starr & Jane Collier eds.,
1989); see also BEYOND METHODOLOGY: FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP AS LIVED RESEARCH
(Mary Fonow & Judith Cook eds., 1991).
69. Kessler, supra note 66, at 14.
70. I owe this analysis to Joan Williams. See Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra
note 8, at 807.
71. Id.; see also Joan C. Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of
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of femininity. An ethic of care does not do this. While an ethic of care
presumes to describe women, it is inaccurate for several reasons. First,
just as women have been socialized to be caring, they have also been
socialized to be passive and dependent on others; second, as discussed
earlier, many women have escaped this socialization.
A wonderful example of how the theory of care does not always
account for the reality of women's lives is the story of the little girl in
Margaret Atwood's Cat's Eye.72 Elaine is "friendly" with three other
girls. Among other things, the girls force her to walk three steps in front
of them; they bury her in a deep pit, covering it with planks and then
with dirt; and they abandon her after she falls into ice, where she almost
freezes to death. 73 In short, they demean her, and almost kill her. These
little girls do not conform to our image of children who play together
cooperatively and stop a game when it appears that they will hurt some-
one. These are cruel girls who delight in torturing their "friend."
This story resounds with many women, who recognize themselves as
either Elaine or her "friends," and also remember how unpleasant little
girls can be to each other. An ethic of care does not explain this cruelty.
For that matter, neither does an ethic of rights, showing the limits of
both paradigms.74
Instead, we need to put alleged differences into a context so that we
can describe the actualities of law practice, see the limits of using the
paradigms of ethics of care and rights to describe behavior, and only then
determine the meanings of differences.
I. A Contextual Approach
Given the difficulties of correlating an ethic of care with women's
style, I now explore a second position from which to analyze methods of
lawyering: a contextual approach. This approach does not deny that
some male and female lawyers are different, but rather examines how
lawyers actually practice; it then evaluates the impact of these differences
in practice; and then questions whether they can form the basis for new
Choice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1992); Joan C. Williams, Domesticity as the Danger-
ous Supplement of Liberalism, 2 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 70 (1991).
72. MARGARET ATwOOD, CAT'S EYE (1988).
73. Id at 198-203.
74. One could argue that little girls' actions toward one another are structured by their
relationships to one another and their feelings of connection to one friend, but not to another
girl. This still does not explain, however, the hostility and abuse directed at the excluded girl.
For a discussion of the importance of looking at literature to provide a better understand-
ing of complexities in practice, see Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A
Problem of Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992).
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methods of lawyering. As such, it goes beyond the descriptive. By look-
ing at the social context, we first shift "analysis away from fixing abstract
and binary differences to examining the social relations and contexts in
which multiple differences are constructed, undermined, and given mean-
ing."' 75 At that point, we can challenge the meanings ascribed to what
have been observed as differences.
To show how context helps to interpret allegedly gendered styles, I
will reinterpret one of the hypotheticals used in the Stanford University
Law School survey of 1500 graduates, which was designed to test wo-
men's supposedly different reasoning process. I then discuss the societal
attitudes that help form the expected responses to this hypothetical.
A. Reinterpreting Hypotheticals
The hypothetical was designed to test whether there was a distinct
women's perspective on moral problems presented by legal issues. 76 The
hypothetical concerned the issue of standing: A mother wanted to ap-
peal her son's conviction for murder, and respondents were asked to de-
cide whether she should be able to do so, notwithstanding her son's
objections.77 The respondents then were asked to rank the importance of
seven factors to their answer: (1) whether the son's desire not to appeal
was more important than the mother's desire to appeal; (2) what the
mother's motive for appealing was-was it because she loved her son or
was she seeking publicity; (3) whether the son realized the effect on his
family of his decision not to appeal; (4) whether the mother loved her
son; (5) whether the son liked his mother; (6) the fact that the woman
was the defendant's mother, rather than his second cousin; and (7)
whether allowing the mother to appeal would mean that more distant
relatives would be able to appeal.78 The study categorized the first five
factors as "contextual" factors-regarding concerns for relationships,
care, and communication-and the last two factors as "abstract"-deter-
minations based on rights, logic, and abstract justice. 79
75. Thorne, supra note 66, at 100, 112. For further discussion of the social construction
of facts, see Holly B. Fechner, Note, Toward an Expanded Conception of Law Reform: Sexual
Harassment Law and the Reconstruction of Facts, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 475 (1990).
76. Taber et al., supra note 13, at 1227, 1248-49. As the Boalt study points out, some
problems may exist in using a "classroom hypothetical presented in an entirely legalistic con-
text, complete with the rule of law." Homer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 15. Notwithstand-
ing the construction of the hypothetical, there were some differences between the responses of
male and female graduates.
77. Taber et al., supra note 13, at 1278.
78. Id. at 1278-79.
79. Id. at 1248-49. Interestingly, the authors never articulate which factors were contex-
tual and which were abstract. Presumably, however, the factors were categorized as indicated.
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Men and women responded similarly to five factors, including
whether the son realized the effect on his family of his decision not to
appeal, and the basis of the mother's motive for appealing.80 Male and
female graduates rated differently only two factors: whether the mother
loved her son, and whether the son liked his mother.8 1 The study's au-
thors concluded that, when men and women differed, women rated con-
textual factors higher than did the men, although they did not know why
men and women differed on only some of the contextual factors.82 The
authors reasoned that women appeared to focus more readily on the
quality of the mother-son relationship, which might explain the varying
importance placed on factors regarding the mother's and son's feelings
towards each other.83 Ultimately, the authors believed that the responses
provided "some, although limited, support to Gilligan's theory" about
different moral approaches. 84
I have a slightly different theory. The responses to this hypothetical
do not show a distinctively feminine voice that considers connection and
context to be more relevant. Men and women both considered equally
relevant the mother's motive and whether the son had considered the
effect on his family of his decision. These are both connection and con-
textual factors that go beyond rules of law; neither of these factors was
legally relevant to the Supreme Court decision that inspired the hypo-
thetical. Instead, the responses show that, for purposes of only two of
the five contextual factors, women may have identified with the mother
and respected the mother-son bond. This is not because the women were
necessarily more caring; rather, it is because women are socialized into
motherhood,85 into stereotypes that the mother-child bond is theirs to
establish and hold sacred. Based on this socialization process, women
should rate as more important to their decision the factors that relate to
the mother-son bond. The responses do not necessarily show that wo-
men have a universal voice that is more focused on relationships and
connection; they show, instead, that many (though not all) women iden-
tified more with the (female) mother than with the (male) son.86 While
80. Id. at 1249.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1249-51.
83. Id. at 1249, 1251.
84. Id. at 1250.
85. For a discussion of the totalizing nature of this social construction, see Fineman, The
Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, supra note 6; Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in
Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274, 289-93.
86. If the responses can show that women are more attuned to connection, then they also
may show how this connection can be smothering. The mother seeks to override her son's
needs for her own needs in the relationship.
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the authors suggest that the relatively few differences between male and
female respondents might result from the socialization process into a
legal mindset,87 I believe that they show more about the socialization
into motherhood than about the process of becoming a lawyer. 88
B. Context
Feminist jurisprudence, and feminism in other areas,89 has become
preoccupied with the existence and meaning of gender differences. How
does a feminist analysis of gender differences affect legal practice?
First, a feminist analysis (or other outsider-based analysis) can begin
to identify what the dominant style has left out of the conventional view
by questioning the inevitability and neutrality of that dominance. 90 The
"female" style discussed earlier may not correlate with women, but it
does point to alternatives (some of which already exist within practice).
Second, the feminist analysis shows us how society constructs gender,91
how gender constructs society,92 and how dangerous these constructions
are because they ignore variations within and among men and women.
Third, by challenging what has been left out, feminist theory adds in
some of the missing context.
This analysis of social construction leads to a questioning of existing
methods of practice. Thinking about who has developed existing models
gives us an appreciation of the social context that fosters these prac-
tices.93 Thus, gender, when defined as a socially constructed term, is use-
87. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). For a critique of this case and its notions of
standing, see Ann Althouse, Standing, in Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1177 (1991).
88. Another example of how women do not have an unwavering ethic of care is in the
reasons women chose to become lawyers. The Boalt study found that women are more likely
to choose law because of a desire to help society. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 28, 51
tbl. 2. However, a similar study, conducted 20 years ago, found almost the opposite results.
The study's procedures were to write to each of 134 accredited law schools for names and
addresses of female graduates in the years 1956-1965, with one male from each class. Ques-
tionnaires were sent to 2219 women and 2151 men. 1298 women and 1329 men responded.
The study found that twice as many women as men stated that "good remuneration" was a
very important reason for their attending law school. James J. White, Women in the Law, 65
MICH. L. REv. 1051, 1069 (1967). This does not suggest an unwavering feminine voice that is
focused on relationships or doing good for society.
89. The most obvious example is psychology. See GILLIGAN, supra note 41; Hyde, supra
note 66.
90. See Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 1992) (manuscript at 106, on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
91. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 843. For a fascinating account of how the medical profes-
sion constructs sex, see Kessler, supra note 66.
92. See essays collected in FEMINiSM/PosTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
93. See Vicki Schultz, Room to Maneuver (f)or a Room of One's Own? Practice Theory
and Feminist Practice, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 123, 143-44 (1989) (arguing that recognition
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ful analytically as part of a feminist analysis that seeks change. I agree
with Deborah Rhode when she states:
The sameness/difference dilemma cannot be resolved; it can only be
reformulated.... To make significant progress, our strategies must
rest on feminist principles, not feminine stereotypes. The issues of
greatest concern to women are not simply "women's issues."
Although the feminist platform incorporates values traditionally asso-
ciated with women, the stakes in its realization are ones that both sexes
share.94
Instead, given that gender is a social construct, and that society con-
structs different meanings for gender,95 it is clear that there are no uni-
versal descriptions within each gender. For example, it means something
different to me than to Phyllis Schlafly to be a white woman.96 People
can make some choices as to what being a woman means to them.97 Be-
ing male or female does not invariably determine behavior. The meaning
and organization of gender varies widely. The sociologist Barrie Thorne
notes that, when girls and boys are organized on opposing sides, children
on each side may ally themselves within that gender, with some antago-
nism to the other side, but, when situations are based on lines other than
of the social construction of gender alone is insufficient). Of course, I am critiquing from
within the paradigm; I accept the limits of this critique.
94. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem, supra note 7, at 1790-91; see also Leslie Bender,
From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in
Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1, 9 (1990) (concluding that gender difference should continue to inform
feminist theorizing, and that "we cannot neuter the strategies and seek the transformative
potential they offer by ignoring their source in women's acculturation and socialization"); Es-
telle Freedman, Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference: An Overview, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER DIFFERENCES, supra note 39, at 257 (stating that, "what we lack
at present is a framework that neither uncritically embraces nor overcritically rejects ideas
about male/female differences").
95. We have enough studies of discrimination against women to prove that men and
women are treated differently. We also have enough studies to show that there are differences
in socialization between boys and girls. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. To
argue that this different treatment does not result in other differences is contrary to common
sense. Nonetheless, we must be careful not to generalize that, because some women act in
certain ways, and because many women are perceived to act in a certain way, there is an
identifiable woman's style.
96. See Kay Deaux & Brenda Major, A Social-Psychological Model of Gender, in THEO-
RETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER DIFFERENCES, supra note 39, at 93; see also Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Not by Law Alone: From a Debate with Phyllis Schlafly, in FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 21 (1987).
97. See Naomi R. Cahn, The Reasonable Woman, 77 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
Sept. 1992) [hereinafter Cahn, The Reasonable Woman]; but see Joan W. Scott, Book Review,
15 SIGNS 848 (1990) (reviewing LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLI-
TICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988), which critiques assumptions of women as
"active" agents of change).
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gender, then boys and girls interact without "gender-marked ways,"
often, for example, playing some games in mixed groups.
98
The stories and studies recounted in this Article show differences in
socialization and perception, and they show that some women learn to
behave in certain ways that result in, and conform to, feminine stereo-
types. However, these differences do not show an identifiably female
style of being a lawyer. There are many women who do not exhibit the
attributes I have ascribed to a female style of lawyering, and some men
who do.
What is most important is the recognition that there is no one way
to practice law effectively, and that monolithic male models do not de-
scribe how the profession practices law, nor how best to serve clients.
Indeed, as Nina Tarr shows in her examination of two rural female law-
yers, an ethic of care already exists in the reality constructed by rural
society of a lawyer's role.99 We need to look at how lawyers actually
practice, what techniques individual lawyers use,lc ° as well as how legal
profession norms create an ideal worker and penalize others.101 What
studying male and female styles can do is open us up to appreciate the
diversity in practice. There is a hierarchy of gender differences that val-
ues men over women, 10 2 that makes male style the norm, and nonmale
styles aberrational. In practice, however, both styles are used, and men
and women need to understand each style's strengths and weaknesses.
Through this recognition, we should strive to value the differences,
to learn what alternative styles teach us about our own practice.103 As a
feminist, I must take seriously those values that have traditionally been
identified as feminine. Rather than identifying a monolithic female style,
however, I want to use these values to examine and to challenge existing
98. Thorne, supra note 66, at 107.
99. Nina W. Tarr, Two Women Attorneys and Country Practice, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript at 36, on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
100. The Hastings Conference drew together many who have begun this examination,
such as Anthony Alfieri, Richard Boswell, Clark Cunningham, Phyllis Goldfarb, Ann Shal-
leek, and Lucie White.
101. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftee. The Struggle for Parental Equality,
38 UCLA L. REv. 1415 (1991); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 8.
102. Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 331 (1984-85); see also Frances
Olsen, Feminism and Critical Legal Theory: An American Perspective, 18 INT'L J. Soc. L. 199
(1990) (arguing that thinking is structured around sexualized dualisms, with the "masculine"
term of the pair privileged as superior).
103. See Naomi Cahn, Speaking Differences: The Rules and Relationships of Litigants Dis-
course, 90 MICH. L. Rnv. (forthcoming May 1992) (book review) (addressing the importance
of valuing different styles, and using the subordinated style as a critique of the dominant
model).
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structures, to change our ways of understanding what lawyers do well,
and to recognize the importance of methods that have been overlooked,
or excluded.1°4 Because of the power of existing methods of practice, it
often is difficult to see behind them or beyond them.105 Beginning to talk
about what has been excluded is the first step in the process of change.
10 6
While this is not sufficient, it serves to broaden the agenda-to begin the
process, called for by Ann Shalleck, of "creat[ing] a framework for chal-
lenging what is dangerous or harmful within dominant forms of lawyer-
ing activity" and to inform a process of creating something new.
10 7
The legal system may be unable to accommodate new styles, or even
to acknowledge the existence of a multiplicity of styles.10 8 Indeed, some
of these innovations, such as the need to restructure the workplace,
might permanently change lawyering.10 9 The need to address how gen-
der structures attorney-client relationships may result in other
changes.110 Nonetheless, the legal profession is changing and accepting
new styles."' Many of these changes result from different people enter-
ing the legal system-people who have different backgrounds and who
have been socialized to be mothers, rather than fathers-that, for exam-
ple, value family as well as work. The changes result, in part, from a
different way of thinking-not only by women, but also, and perhaps
more importantly, about women. 112
104. See Judith Leonie Miller, Making Change: Women and Ethics in the Practice of Law,
2 YALE J.L. & FEM. 453, 467 (1990) (book review) (arguing that we must address the differing
merits of the different voices).
105. This is a theme developed by, among others, Richard Delgado. See, e.g., Delgado,
supra note 90; Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. RV. (forthcom-
ing 1992).
106. See Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2
TEX. WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 1992) (summarizing the importance of narrative).
107. Shalleck, supra note 6, at 1073-74.
108. See Lizbeth Hasse, Legalizing Gender-Specific Values, in WOMEN AND MORAL THE-
ORY, supra note 42, at 282, 289 (stating that "accommodation" of a women's morality may be
impossible).
109. We should not call this a woman's innovation, however, even though it emerges from
women's historic role and responsibilities.
110. For an examination of how gendered constructs can silence people in the legal sys-
tem, see Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mr G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990) [hereinafter White, Sunday Shoes].
111. The move to alternative dispute resolution is a sign of this. For a critique of the rush
to these methods, see Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women,
100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
112. A polling firm found that a majority of women and men believe children are deprived
when their mothers worked. The firm, however, did not ask whether children are deprived
when theirfathers worked full time. Paul Taylor, Struggling to Be a Woman for All Seasons,
WASH. POST, May 12, 1991, at Al.
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C. Connection and Lawyering
Given the interest in the debate over male and female styles of lawy-
ering, and the importance of looking at the values underlying each sup-
posed form of lawyering, the question is not whether women speak in a
different voice, but how different voices can change how we practice law.
Notwithstanding the problems of "the different voice" approach, the
subordinated values that outsider jurisprudence can expose still may be
useful in creating new forms of practice. Indeed, feminists are beginning
to address how to incorporate different values into the attorney-client
relationship,' 13 an important inquiry given the significance of this rela-
tionship to daily legal practice. I will examine one concept that is com-
monly thought to typify the different feminine voice and also is a
component in a contextual approach: connection. Many feminists use
"connection" to explain why women are different from men.1 14 Regard-
less of whether this thesis is correct-because there are many ways in
which men demonstrate and use connection-connection is one of the
many attributes that is useful to consider in the process of redefining the
attorney role. We can reject its descriptiveness of all women, but still
acknowledge its potential for transformation.
Many forms of connection are antithetical to the attorney-client re-
lationship. 11 5 If the concern over different forms of lawyering highlights
issues of connection and the lack thereof in the attorney-client relation-
ship, then should we encourage more connection? This section explores
the significance of connection in feminism and in the lawyering process,
and then examines whether more connection is desirable.
Connection is an important concept for "cultural" and radical femi-
nists. Carol Gilligan uses connection to explore girls' psychological de-
velopment. She suggests that women are more caring' 1 6 because they
view themselves as interconnected to others. 117 Robin West explains:
113. For some of the most prominent examples, see Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice
Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991);
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 50; Menkel-Meadow, The Compara-
tive Sociology, supra note 50; Shalleck, supra note 6; White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 110.
It is not just feminists, of course, who are seeking transformation, and the feminist efforts
can complement those of other groups. For an example that includes critical race theory, see
L6pez, supra note 4.
114. See infra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
115. See Naomi Cahn, A Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHIcs 23 (1990) (discussing constraints on lawyers' behavior); infra notes 125-128 and ac-
companying text.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
117. Gilligan, supra note 41, at 29.
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Underlying both radical and cultural feminism is a conception of wo-
men's existential state that is grounded in women's potential for physi-
cal, material connection to human life, just as underlying both liberal
and critical legalism is a conception of men's existential state that is
grounded in the inevitability of men's physical separation from the
species. 118
This "physical, material" connection symbolizes the ability of women to
focus on relationships. 19
Like Gilligan and West, Deborah Tannen uses the concept of con-
nection to explain how many women approach the world.120 While men
focus on status and one-upmanship, she believes that women see them-
selves "as... individual[s] in a network of connections." 121 Using socio-
linguistics, she analyzes how men and women interpret speech based on
their underlying perspectives of status and connection.
Connection is, of course, not a monolithic concept, and includes no-
tions of empathy and intimacy. Through empathy, we can "understandl
the experience or situation of another, both affectively and cogni-
tively."' 22 Empathy allows us to draw on our own experiences so that
we can understand, and thus feel connected to, others. Kathleen Sullivan
has recently discussed intimacy in the clinical supervisor-student rela-
tionship;1 23 many of her insights are transferable to the attorney-client
relationship. She characterizes intimacy as involving four aspects: self-
disclosure, proximity, mutuality, and trust, all of which lead to both su-
118. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988).
119. At the same time as some feminists celebrate women's abilities to connect, however,
other feminists do not. Catharine MacKinnon claims that women value care only because that
is what men have allowed them to do. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Domi-
nance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 36 (1987). Some socialist femi-
nists believe that the story of women's oppression is alienation. See ROSEMARIE TONG,
FEMINIST THOUGHT 192 (1990). Nonetheless, even if care and connection (as associated with
the feminine) result from false consciousness, they still can be important-it is critical to rec-
ognize that we value them not because they have been used to describe women, but because of
their own intrinsic worth. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transforma-
tion of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1195 (1989) ("[W]omen may have to move
toward a society in which socially female qualities are valued by resorting to some gender-
neutral programs.").
120. TANNEN, supra note 15, at 25.
121. Id. She further observes that "l]ife, then, is a community, a struggle to preserve
intimacy and avoid isolation."
122. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1579 (1987);
see Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1992). For a discussion
of the importance and dangers of empathy in understanding through analogies, see Trina
Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Mak-
ing Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397.
123. Kathleen Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the
Clinical Relationship (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
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pervisor and student personally knowing each other. 124 Similarly, with
this type of intimacy and sharing, attorneys and clients can form connec-
tions based on mutual trust and knowledge.
On the other hand, lawyers have carefully structured relationships
with their clients and, indeed, appear to avoid connection, or even associ-
ation, with their clients.125 The traditional image 126 of the lawyer is that
she can espouse the viewpoint of any client; although once she begins the
representation, she is prohibited from representing another client with a
conflicting viewpoint in the same action. In representing a particular cli-
ent, she is not responsible for that client's moral or political beliefs.
127
David Luban summarizes this principle of "nonaccountability": "In rep-
resenting a client, a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor morally
accountable for the means [and] ends achieved."
128
As part of nonaccountability, a lawyer is not responsible for the cli-
ent's actions with respect to third parties. 129 In many states a lawyer is
not even required to reveal client confidences in order to prevent death or
serious bodily harm.1 30 The lawyer is constructed as an autonomous
creature, connected by contract to her client, but otherwise detached
from her client's perspectives and from the effects of her client's actions
on the surrounding community. (As Ann Shalleck points out, many law-
yers deviate from this conception and there has been much internal cri-
tique of this model.)
Commentators have suggested reforms within legal ethics to recog-
nize that lawyers should choose clients only after examining and approv-
ing their goals. Perhaps the strongest proponent of this method is
124. Id at 6.
125. This may provide some understanding of what Stephen Ellmann is describing when
he argues that lawyers should be able to express approval to their clients. See Ellmann, supra
note 122.
126. To some extent, the following discussion simplifies the traditional structure of the
legal profession. In using the professional codes to establish this structure, I am treating them
as the recognized aspirational goals; obviously, not all lawyers actually adhere to them, nor do
all lawyers believe they represent the appropriate goals. For some dissenting views, see infra
notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
127. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1989) ("A lawyer's repre-
sentation of a client.., does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic,
social or moral view or activities.")
128. David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relation-
ship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004, 1004 (1990) (citing DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988)).
129. See Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client Deliberation
Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990) (arguing
that lawyers should be obligated to explore with their clients the implications of any legal
action on third parties).
130. E.g., D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c).
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William Simon, who advocates a "discretionary" approach to choosing
clients.131 He suggests that lawyers represent clients only after "an as-
sessment of the relative merits of the client's goals and claims and the
goals and claims of others whom the lawyer might serve ... [and] an
effort to confront and resolve the competing factors that bear on the in-
ternal merits of the client's goals and claims." 132 That is, the lawyer
judges the worthiness of the client's claim before deciding whether to
represent her. This is similar to the ethic for legal services offices sug-
gested by Paul Tremblay.1 33 He advocates that, in deciding which cases
to accept, legal services lawyers should examine the values and needs of
the client's community.1 34 A lawyer should decide which clients to rep-
resent based on her understanding of the client's community's values and
interests, together with advice from community members.1 35 Lawyers
are thus connected to the goals of their clients and, hence, presumably to
the clients themselves.
David Luban takes another look at moral worthiness; he suggests
that in certain cases, such as rape, the lawyers' role should be to protect
individuals against powerful institutions, such as the state or patri-
archy.136 Thus, in cross-examining an alleged rape victim, a criminal
defense lawyer ought not "make [the victim] look like a whore."
137
These approaches allow the lawyer some connection to the client's
goals, because the lawyer decides on the merits of the client's claims.
They do not address connection, however, in the same way as many fem-
inists, who focus on interpersonal relationships. 138 Feeling approval of
the client's goals is different from feeling connected to the client and her
needs. Indeed, the very process of judging a client's worthiness involves
the application of universal principles in a broad context. That is, to
judge any individual client's claim, the attorney refers to broad, commu-
nity-based norms that she determines (albeit after consultation with the
131. William Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. Rnv. 1083, 1083
(1988).
132. Id. at 1091.
133. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice,
37 UCLA L. REV. 1101 (1990).
134. Id. at 1139.
135. Id. at 1145.
136. Luban, supra note 128, at 1028-31.
137. Id. at 1031. Thomas Shaffer articulates another approach. He suggests that lawyers
use a "morality of care" in their relationship with their clients. This care morality involves the
lawyer's belief that, with her client, they can make moral choices; and that the lawyer has an
investment in the client's goodness. THOMAS SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT,
READINGS, AND DISCUSSION Topics 448-53 (1985).
138. See supra notes 113-124 and accompanying text.
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client's community), rather than focusing on the more immediate, and
obvious, needs of the individual client.
Even though the process uses context, at least in the sense of judging
the merits of a potential client's claims in relation to those of other poten-
tial clients, this use of context frames the lawyer's decision rather than
the client's situation. The lawyer does not care about any particular cli-
ent until she has decided that this client merits representation. Context
merely helps in her decision as to whether to represent the particular
client. The resulting connection is not necessarily to individual people,
but to abstract principles of justice.
A feminist connection in the attorney-client relationship could in-
volve a different conception, one which requires the lawyer to empathize
with, or listen to, her client, rather than imposing her preconceived no-
tions on the client's problems. 139 The lawyer would "demonstrate
greater sensitivity to client relations."' 14
To see how this might work in an actual attorney-client meeting, I
have listened to many attorney-client conversations, read others, and at-
tempted to imagine new forms of conversation. I have often felt para-
lyzed by critiques of lawyering. Nonetheless, we must foster the
possibilities of creating new dialogues between lawyers and clients, while
remaining aware of the dangers.
Among the promises of connection is an improved attorney-client
relationship, with better communication. First, a lawyer would try to
place questions of legal strategy into a larger context. For example, in a
settlement negotiation, the lawyer might initiate the discussion by
broaching the narrow issue of the other side's offer, although without
framing a question designed to elicit a simple yes or no response. In-
stead, she might use the conversation as an opportunity to review the
client's goals in initiating litigation. This opens the conversation to issues
beyond the sum of money offered, to the psychological and emotional
needs of the client. Second, a lawyer could question virtually every state-
ment of her own and of her client to understand her own hidden agenda
and to prevent her from distorting the client's agenda. She would be
conscious that she can manipulate her client, and would try not to do so.
139. See supra notes 122-124; Alfieri, supra note 4, at 2126; Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a
Different Voice, supra note 50, at 57 (noting that "the values of care and responsibility for
others seem most directly applicable" within the attorney-client relationship); White, Sunday
Shoes, supra note 110, at 3-4.
140. Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda, supra note 7, at 316.
This does not mean that the lawyer always approves of the client's case. Many lawyers
often feel torn between their own personal moral principles and the merits of any client's story.
See, e.g., Ashe & Cahn, supra note 106.
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She would attempt to critically engage herself, both to think within the
situation and also to step outside of the conversation, to act as a partici-
pant observer.14' Third, the lawyer might attempt to use the settlement
process to expose power relations and (perhaps) to empower her client.
She would seek to ensure that her client takes responsibility for settle-
ment decisions, rather than falling into the easier paradigm of the lawyer
who takes control. 42 She would not want to act simply as the answer-
giver, the authority figure.'
43
Notwithstanding these promises, there are, of course, many persua-
sive arguments against connection. First, a call to connection is itself
somewhat disingenuous because one is always connected to someone or
something, and the truly complex issues emerge from the need to choose
to what or whom to be connected. 44 Assuming the choice is a feminist
connection to one's client, then perhaps the most compelling arguments
against this choice suggest that connection provides an opportunity to
exploit, rather than to empathize and better represent. That is, through
connection with her client, exploitation of both lawyer and client can
occur in three ways: First, a lawyer can co-opt the client's goals, using
the client to work toward the lawyer's goals; second, the lawyer can lose
any sense of self, and revert to the traditional image of the lawyer as
hired gun; 45 and third, connection may become a useful illusion for a
lawyer, who, even though she believes she has established an equal rela-
141. See infra notes 113-124 and accompanying text.
142. To some extent, she may need to do this for self-preservation. Connection with a
client can prove to be emotionally draining, and it can be difficult to separate from a client and
her responsibilities. See JACK & JACK, supra note 29, at 152-54 (discussing methods by which
caring and empathetic lawyers limit their responsibilities to their clients).
143. See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401,403 (1987) ("In my experience, most non-corporate
clients looked to lawyers almost as gods. They were frightened, pleading, dependent (and
resentful of their dependence) . . ").
This does not mean that the lawyer should never state her opinion of what her client
should do. The dilemma is ensuring that the lawyer's opinions do not become the client's
opinions, but are instead used as one factor in the client's decision-making process.
144. See Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REv. 617, 631-32
(1990) (noting that, with respect to judges, "an appeal to empathetic values leaves most of the
difficult questions unanswered. With whom should legal decisionmaking empathize when in-
dividual needs conflict?"). Moreover, unlike the feminists discussed earlier, I do not believe
that connection is a "feminine" value. Men, too, exhibit connection in many different
contexts.
145. Carrie Menkel-Meadow may think this is a good idea. See Menkel-Meadow, Portia
in a Different Voice, supra note 50, at 57 ("More fully developed sensitivities to empathy and
altruism ... may enable women lawyers to understand a fuller range of client needs and
objectives.").
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tionship with her client, nonetheless dominates the connection and masks
the power relationships.
This exploitation can occur because of the structures of dominance
and subordination in the attorney-client relationship; 146 the possibility
for exploitation is inherent in such a relationship. As progressive law-
yers, many of us want to collaborate, to work with our clients in develop-
ing a legal strategy. 147 We are genuine in our efforts to break down what
we perceive as the distances and discordances between lawyer and cli-
ent-distances and discordances that are mutual. We strive to under-
stand our clients and their communities. Nonetheless, when we become
connected to a client and develop a relationship with her, this "represents
an intrusion and intervention into a system of relationships, a system of
relationships that the [lawyer] is far freer than the [client] to leave. The
inequality and potential treacherousness of this relationship seems ines-
capable." 148 When we work with clients, we inevitably impose on them
expectations of how they should act (and they impose expectations on us,
too).149 When I write about my hopes for working with a client, I write
in my own words, often without asking them what they think.150
This exploration of opportunities for exploitation does not leave me
hopeless, however, about the possibilities and promises of connection.
Connection remains an important component in the attorney-client rela-
tionship, which can be constructive for both attorney and client. By
naming its problems explicitly, we can try to avoid misusing connec-
tion. 151 Moreover, connection must include self-awareness and question-
146. See Alfieri, supra note 4, at 2118; see also Calm, The Reasonable Woman, supra note
97 (arguing that legal constructs may result in client subordination); Austin Sarat, " .. The
Law is All Over". Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 347 (1990) (discussing dynamic of power and resistance in lawyer-client
relationship).
147. See Alfieri, supra note 4, at 2140-41; L6pez, supra note 4.
148. Judith Stacey, Can There be a Feminist Ethnography?, 11 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L
FEMINISM 21, 23 (1988). Stacey made these observations about the ethnographer and her
research subject, but her conclusions seem equally applicable to the lawyer-client relationship.
See also Marilyn Strathern, An Awkward Relationship: The Case of Feminism and Anthropol-
ogy, 12 SIGNS 276, 289 (1987) (arguing that "using people's experiences to make statements
about matters of anthropological interest in the end subordinates them to the uses of the
discipline").
149. See Sarat, supra note 146.
150. For an attempt at improved client collaboration, see Clark D. Cunningham, The
Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77
CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming Sept. 1992).
151. Unfortunately, it is not enough merely to name problems in order to overcome them,
although naming is a first step. See PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970).
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ing.152 This ability to maintain a perspective both inside and outside of
the relationship is critical to fostering connection that is minimally ex-
ploitative. While our alliance with our clients will always be grounded in
power inequalities,15 3 our common interests can make the relationship
more equitable.
Conclusion
We can make some generalizations based on the data about male
and female styles. Women, because they have been socialized into moth-
erhood, may be more attentive to relationships. Because women have
been excluded from the workplace and have lower incomes, they may be
more likely to take time off when they have children. Such generaliza-
tions are dangerous, however, unless we qualify them. Moving beyond
sameness and difference brings us back to gendered individuals who act
within a variety of different structures and who are influenced by, and in
turn influence, those structures.
154
Instead, it is more productive to use insights gained by studying dif-
ferent lawyering styles to transform how we practice law. For example,
insights into an ethic of care can make our legal ethics more responsive
to the conflicts that lawyers actually face when they are representing cli-
ents. Insights into the need for parents to take time off to spend with
children can help us transform the workplace.1 55 Insights into the im-
portance of listening to clients can help us transform attorney-client rela-
tionships.156 It is important to recognize different styles and needs, to try
to look behind existing structures to see upon what they are constructed.
We should value multiple voices, without forgetting the power differen-
tials that have shaped, and generally silenced, these "other voices." 157
Returning to my original theme of what would characterize a female
or male style of lawyering, the answer is that we do not really know; nor,
perhaps, should we care. Instead, we should examine how people prac-
152. This concept is similar to what Tony Alfieri labels "critical distance." Alfieri, supra
note 4, at 2125.
153. See Strathern, supra note 148, at 290-91 (1987) (discussing a feminist critique of eth-
nography for assuming symmetrical power relationships such that collaboration between sub-
ject and object is possible).
154. Nancy Fraser & Linda Nicholson, Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encoun-
ter Between Feminism and Postmodernism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 19 (Linda Nichol-
son ed., 1990); see also Schultz, supra note 93.
155. Czapanskiy, supra note 101, at 1455-56; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note
8, at 832-36.
156. Alfieri, supra note 4, at 2146-47.
157. As Linda Gordon has stated, pluralism was never merely a recognition of variation
but a masking of inequality. Scott, supra note 97, at 849-50.
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tice law, what styles people use, and how these different styles affect at-
torney-client relationships, opposing counsel interactions, and court
appearances. Some of what we observe may correlate with attributes
that have been labeled male or female, even though both men and women
may be using "cross-gendered" styles.158 What is important is to recog-
nize that many attributes of what has been labeled a "female style of
lawyering" could help improve the litigation process and that, in fact,
many already have been implemented by men and women.
Feminist theory helps us critique existing lawyering methods, and
develop and appreciate alternative methods of being a lawyer, but does
not require us to label these new developments by gender. It counsels us
to value these methods and use them to transform our practices by recog-
nizing that they have much to teach us about new possibilities.
158. It is true that some of these alternatives incorporate what is socially constructed as a
"female" value-for example, meditation, less adversariness, and more time at home. It is also
true that some of these alternatives can be inverted-mediation is not female, but is male,
because it assumes an equally matched contest from which compromise will result (or the
mediator could be seen as an umpire, a sports metaphor). Whether something is male or
female thus depends on the viewer's perspective. Therefore, we need to identify alternative
styles, not necessarily a female style.
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